As China eyes Taiwan and Russia watches Europe, a dangerous game of opportunism threatens to stretch U.S. military resources to the breaking point. Can Washington balance these twin threats, or will the Indo-Pacific become the stage for a global unraveling?

A Global Chessboard Under Strain

In June 2025, NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte issued a stark warning: if China’s Xi Jinping ever moves to invade Taiwan, he’ll likely call his “junior partner,” Vladimir Putin, to keep the U.S. and its allies tied up in Europe. The quip about Putin’s subordinate role raised eyebrows, but it also sparked debate. Critics argue that the Russia-China partnership is a marriage of convenience, not a pact of mutual favors. Yet the real issue isn’t about favors—it’s about opportunism. A distracted U.S., bogged down in one theater, opens windows for aggression in another. As China prepares for a potential Taiwan invasion, and Russia probes for weaknesses in Europe, the U.S. faces a critical challenge: its military resources, stretched thin by decades of underinvestment and competing priorities, may not be enough to handle both fronts. This article explores China’s strategy for Taiwan, the pivotal role of non-naval forces, and the delicate balance of power that could shape the Indo-Pacific’s future.

The Taiwan Gambit: China’s Five-Step Plan

A Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a monumental undertaking, potentially the largest amphibious operation in history. While Beijing’s exact plans remain shrouded, any invasion would likely follow five phases: mobilization, crossing the Taiwan Strait, establishing a beachhead, offloading materiel, and capturing the island. Each step reveals vulnerabilities that China and Russia could exploit, particularly by straining U.S. military resources across the globe.

Phase 1: Mobilization

Invading Taiwan begins with assembling a massive force along China’s coast—an estimated million troops, dwarfing the 150,000 of D-Day. This would require moving men, tanks, and supplies into position, a process that could take a month. Beijing might disguise this as a military exercise, but U.S. intelligence, fresh off its success in predicting Russia’s 2022 Ukraine invasion, would likely see through the ruse. The challenge lies in timing: the U.S. must preposition materiel in Taiwan before the invasion begins, as resupplying an island under siege is far harder than aiding Ukraine via NATO’s land borders.

This phase exposes a core U.S. vulnerability: limited stockpiles. Decades of reduced defense spending post-Cold War, coupled with a focus on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, have left the Pentagon short on critical systems like HIMARS, ATACMS, and artillery shells. These are in demand not only for Taiwan but also for Ukraine and potential European conflicts. If Russia escalates in the Baltics, as Rutte fears, the U.S. Army’s resources could be stretched to the breaking point.

Phase 2: Crossing the Taiwan Strait

The Taiwan Strait, spanning 140 to 220 kilometers, is a treacherous waterway, with only April and October offering favorable conditions. Even then, storms could delay China’s plans, buying the U.S. time to mobilize. The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) would face a gauntlet of U.S. naval forces, including aircraft carriers rushed to the region from bases like Okinawa. Taiwan would contribute, deploying sea mines and land-based Harpoon missiles to target Chinese ships.

Here, the overlap with Europe becomes clear. Harpoons, vital for Taiwan’s defense, could also be sent to Ukraine to counter Russia’s Black Sea Fleet or to Baltic states to deter Russia’s Baltic Fleet. ATACMS, with a 300-kilometer range, could strike Chinese ports from Taiwan, but they’re equally critical for Ukraine’s fight. The U.S. Air Force, operating from Japan, would also play a role, bombing mainland targets to disrupt China’s invasion. Yet every bomb dropped in Asia is one less for Europe, where combined arms operations rely on air superiority—another resource that could be diverted if Russia acts opportunistically.

Phase 3: The Beach Landing

If China reaches Taiwan’s shores, the battle becomes a modern D-Day, with Taiwan’s forces defending fortified beaches. The Taiwanese army’s T91 rifles, firing NATO-standard 5.56mm rounds, would be frontline weapons, but these bullets are also needed in Europe. Heavy artillery, like 155mm shells fired by M777 howitzers, would be critical, as would Javelins to counter Chinese armor and Stingers to down aircraft. Patriot and THAAD systems would protect against missile barrages. These systems, already stretched thin in Ukraine, highlight the materiel crunch: a Taiwan invasion would compete directly with European demands, forcing the U.S. to prioritize.

Phase 4: Offloading Materiel

Securing a beachhead is only the beginning. China must establish supply lines to funnel tanks, artillery, and troops across the Strait. Taiwan’s geography complicates this: its seven deepwater ports would be sabotaged, and the eastern coast’s cliffs are inhospitable. The western coast, with shallow waters, poses another challenge. China is developing a novel solution: “roll-on, roll-off” (ro-ro) ships linked by bridges to form makeshift piers, allowing tanks to roll off despite the shallow shores. These stationary platforms, however, are vulnerable to Taiwanese Harpoons or Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS)—systems also coveted by Ukraine and NATO allies.

Spotting these makeshift ports requires real-time intelligence. Satellites are ideal but vulnerable to Chinese anti-satellite weapons and weather disruptions. ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) drones, many being developed in Ukraine, offer a solution, scanning Taiwan’s 300-kilometer coastline 24/7. Yet these drones, too, could be diverted to Europe, where they’re needed to monitor Russian movements. This interplay underscores the global competition for advanced systems.

Phase 5: The Island Battle

If China establishes a foothold, the fight for Taiwan becomes a grueling campaign. Taipei, nestled in mountainous terrain, and the densely populated west coast favor defenders, enabling prolonged insurgencies akin to Afghanistan. Resupplying Taiwan would be risky, with U.S. naval and air missions facing Chinese blockades. Pre-invasion deliveries are worth double those sent mid-conflict, as many may never arrive. The materiel overlap with Europe—artillery shells, GMLRS, Javelins—means a prolonged Taiwan conflict would drain resources needed to deter Russia in the Baltics or support Ukraine.

The Russia-China Nexus: Opportunism in Action

Rutte’s warning about Putin as Xi’s “junior partner” may oversimplify their relationship, but it captures a truth: Russia and China thrive on U.S. distraction. A Taiwan invasion would tie up U.S. naval, air, and army assets, creating an opening for Russia to act in Europe—perhaps in Estonia or Lithuania. Conversely, a Russian escalation in Europe could delay U.S. reinforcements to the Indo-Pacific, giving China a window to seize Taiwan. North Korea’s potential to “get funky” at the DMZ, requiring 28,000 U.S. troops to bolster South Korea, adds another layer of strain.

The U.S.’s One-China Policy, which avoids formal recognition of Taiwan to deter Beijing, complicates preparations. No U.S. troops are stationed in Taiwan, unlike the Cold War era when Washington backed Taipei as the legitimate China. Deploying a “tripwire” force during a crisis could deter China by raising the stakes of attacking U.S. personnel, but moving a brigade across the Pacific takes a month—potentially too late without exceptional intelligence. Marines, with their expeditionary expertise, might be sent instead, but this would still divert forces from Europe.

Historical Context: A Legacy of Overstretch

The U.S.’s current predicament stems from post-Cold War complacency. The 1990s “peace dividend” slashed defense budgets, prioritizing counterinsurgency over conventional warfare. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan further skewed Pentagon priorities, leaving stockpiles of HIMARS, ATACMS, and artillery shells depleted. Ukraine’s ongoing war has exposed these shortages, with Kyiv’s demands for the same systems Taiwan would need highlighting the global competition for materiel.

China’s Taiwan ambitions trace back to the Chinese Civil War, when the Nationalists fled to the island in 1949. Beijing’s claim to Taiwan as a breakaway province has fueled decades of tension, with military exercises escalating since the 1990s. Russia’s opportunism, meanwhile, echoes its 2014 annexation of Crimea, exploiting Western preoccupation with other crises. The Russia-China “no-limits” partnership, announced before the Ukraine invasion, suggests coordination, even if driven by mutual self-interest rather than loyalty.

The Human and Strategic Cost

For Taiwan’s 23 million people, an invasion would be catastrophic, with urban combat and insurgencies devastating cities like Taipei. U.S. and Taiwanese soldiers would face brutal fighting, while civilians would endure missile barrages and blockades. In Europe, a Russian move could displace millions, as seen in Ukraine, and escalate NATO’s involvement. The U.S.’s ability to project power hinges on its materiel—soldiers can’t fight without bullets, and ships can’t sail without fuel. The human toll of miscalculation would be staggering, from Taipei’s streets to Riga’s borders.

What’s Next: Arming for a Two-Front Fight

The U.S. must address its materiel shortages to deter both China and Russia. NATO’s 2025 Hague Summit called for 3.5% GDP defense spending, a target that could bolster Europe’s self-reliance, freeing U.S. resources for the Indo-Pacific. Prepositioning HIMARS, ATACMS, and artillery in Taiwan and allied bases like Okinawa is critical, as is investing in ISR drones to counter China’s satellite threats. A robust Europe, “armed to the teeth,” could dissuade Putin from exploiting a Taiwan crisis, while a fortified Taiwan could delay China’s invasion long enough for U.S. forces to arrive.

The Pentagon must also rethink its force structure. Combined arms operations, blending naval, air, and ground forces, are essential in both theaters. Developing Ukraine’s drone innovations for Taiwan’s defense could bridge the gap, while diversifying supply chains—perhaps with allies like Australia—could ease materiel constraints. A U.S. counter-invasion of Taiwan, if it falls, is a last resort, but bluffing such a move requires a credible European deterrent to keep Russia in check.

Conclusion: A Test of Resolve

China and Russia’s strategies hinge on exploiting U.S. vulnerabilities—overstretched forces, dwindling stockpiles, and divided attention. A Taiwan invasion would not be a naval affair alone; it would demand the full spectrum of U.S. military power, from Army artillery to Air Force bombers, clashing with Europe’s needs. Rutte’s warning underscores the stakes: if Xi and Putin coordinate, even implicitly, the U.S. could face a two-front crisis it’s ill-equipped to handle. The solution lies in preparation—bolstering defenses, rethinking alliances, and ensuring the materiel is there before the first shot is fired. Will Washington rise to the challenge, or will the Indo-Pacific become the crucible where global power shifts? The clock is ticking.