Naval Showdown in the Pacific: Why the US Still Holds the Edge Over China’s Fleet in 2025

Standing on a snowy trail in Colorado, geopolitical analyst Peter Zeihan recently shared some thoughts that cut through the noise about U.S.-China tensions in the Pacific. With snowflakes swirling and the crunch of boots on frost, he painted a picture that’s equal parts reassuring and sobering for anyone worried about America’s place in the world. It’s July 27, 2025, and headlines are buzzing with reports of U.S. missile tests in the Western Pacific—systems like the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) launcher firing SM-6 missiles at maritime targets during exercises in Australia. Meanwhile, the Navy’s gearing up to deploy anti-ship variants of the iconic Tomahawk missile on destroyers by September. These developments aren’t random; they’re direct responses to China’s growing naval ambitions.

I’ve followed Zeihan’s work for years—he’s got this knack for boiling down complex global dynamics into straightforward insights, often with a dash of dry humor. In his latest take, he dismisses the panic over China’s sheer number of ships, arguing that quality trumps quantity every time. But he doesn’t stop there; he dives into historical treaties, political missteps, and cutting-edge tech that’s tilting the scales back in America’s favor. As someone who’s watched U.S.-China relations simmer from trade wars to outright military posturing, I find his perspective refreshing. It’s not blind optimism—Zeihan acknowledges delays under past administrations—but a clear-eyed assessment of why the U.S. remains the dominant force at sea.

In this piece, I’ll unpack Zeihan’s analysis, weaving in historical context, recent 2025 updates, and broader geopolitical implications. We’ll explore why ship counts mislead, how new missiles are game-changers, and what this means for hotspots like Taiwan or the South China Sea. Along the way, I’ll throw in some reflections—because honestly, in a world where AI and hypersonics are reshaping warfare, who isn’t a bit uneasy about where this heads? If you’re curious about the real balance of power in the Pacific, let’s break it down.

Beyond the Numbers: Why China’s Fleet Size Isn’t the Full Story

Headlines love a good scare: “China Now Has the World’s Largest Navy!” Depending on how you tally, Beijing boasts 370 to 620 vessels, dwarfing the U.S. tally of 250 to 300. It’s easy to feel defeatist, picturing swarms of Chinese ships overwhelming American forces. But as Zeihan points out from his Colorado hike, raw numbers miss the point. Most Chinese ships are small—often under 2,000 tons, like corvettes or patrol boats that the U.S. doesn’t even bother building. They’re coastal defenders, great for bullying neighbors in the South China Sea but useless for blue-water operations far from home.

Only about 10% of China’s fleet can venture beyond 1,000 miles, and even fewer pack weapons with serious reach. Contrast that with U.S. supercarriers like the USS Gerald R. Ford—nuclear-powered behemoths that roam globally, launching jets armed with standoff missiles that strike thousands of miles away. Historically, this echoes naval mismatches of the past: Think Imperial Japan’s carrier fleet in WWII, numerically impressive but outmatched by U.S. industrial might and range. Today, China’s Type 055 destroyers are potent, but their anti-ship missiles like the YJ-18 top out around 300 miles—far short of what U.S. carriers can project via F-35s or incoming hypersonics.

Zeihan’s not alone in this view. A 2025 RAND Corporation report echoes it, noting China’s navy excels in “anti-access/area denial” (A2/AD) bubbles near its shores but struggles with sustained global presence. Geopolitically, this matters: China’s “nine-dash line” claims in the South China Sea rely on short-range assets to intimidate Vietnam or the Philippines. But against U.S. freedom-of-navigation ops? Not so much. I can’t help but wonder: If numbers were everything, why hasn’t China challenged U.S. carriers directly? It’s because range and sustainability win wars, not headcounts.

Still, Zeihan admits concerns about China’s intermediate-range missiles (500-5,500 km) that could theoretically keep U.S. forces at bay. Enter the game-changers: Two new U.S. systems manifesting in 2025, turning potential vulnerabilities into strengths.

Breaking the Treaty Shackles: The Return of Intermediate-Range Missiles

Flash back to the late Cold War: In 1987, Reagan and Gorbachev signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, banning land-based missiles with ranges of 500-5,500 km. It was a breakthrough, reducing nuclear risks in Europe by eliminating quick-strike threats. Land-based systems were targeted because they’re cheaper and stealthier than sea- or air-launched alternatives, potentially destabilizing.

But treaties only work if everyone plays fair. Russia started cheating in the 2010s with systems like the 9M729, prompting U.S. withdrawal in 2019 under Trump. China, never a signatory, built an arsenal of “carrier-killer” missiles like the DF-21D and DF-26, dubbed “Guam Express” for their ability to threaten U.S. bases. Zeihan quips that Beijing figured everyone else was “too dumb” to respond—arrogance that backfired.

Post-INF, the U.S. wasted no time. By 2025, the Army’s Mid-Range Capability (MRC), or Typhon system, is deploying across the Pacific. This truck-mounted launcher fires Tomahawks or SM-6 missiles, with ranges in the thousands of kilometers. Recent tests during Talisman Sabre 2025 in Australia saw it sink maritime targets with SM-6s—anti-ship variants packing a punch against vessels or land sites. Deployments hit U.S. territories like Guam and Midway, with Australia (Darwin base) eager hosts. The Philippines hosted temporary units earlier, irking China, which called it a “dangerous move.”

These aren’t nukes; they’re conventional, but their reach intersects Chinese shipping lanes and patrols. From Guam, they cover the Taiwan Strait; from Australia, the South China Sea. Zeihan notes the speed: Abrogated in 2019, operational by 2024-2025. That’s Pentagon agility at its best, contrasting China’s slower blue-water buildup.

Geopolitically, this shifts dynamics. China’s A2/AD strategy—missiles to deny U.S. access—now faces counters. In a Taiwan scenario, U.S. land-based fires could neutralize Chinese amphibious forces before they launch. But risks abound: Escalation ladders shorten, and basing in allied territories like Japan (still hesitant) could drag partners into conflict. As Zeihan implies, if you’re Beijing, this undercuts your bluster. Personally, it’s a relief—America’s not ceding the Pacific—but it begs the question: How long until arms races spiral further?

Tomahawk’s Evolution: From Gulf War Icon to Ship-Killer

Remember the 1991 Gulf War? Nightly news beamed footage of Tomahawk cruise missiles streaking from U.S. ships, slamming into Iraqi targets with pinpoint accuracy. Debuting in 1991 (though conceived in the 1970s), Tomahawks revolutionized standoff warfare—GPS-guided, 1,000+ mile range, 1,000-pound warhead. But they were land-attack only, leaving naval strikes to other systems.

Fast-forward to 2025: The Maritime Strike Tomahawk (MST), or Block Va, changes that. Upgraded with seekers for moving ships, it’s deploying on destroyers by September’s fiscal year-end, per Navy reports. Submarines get them too, turning Virginia-class subs—already the stealthiest around—into carrier hunters. Zeihan highlights the anti-ship role: One hit from a half-ton warhead sinks most vessels, and AI enables real-time adjustments mid-flight.

China’s DF-series missiles try similar feats but rely on satellites for targeting—vulnerable to U.S. anti-satellite weapons. Zeihan recalls 2008: After China downed a satellite (creating hazardous debris), the U.S. quietly destroyed six of its own with diverse systems, a subtle “we’re ahead” flex. America’s satellite-killing prowess, honed since the 1980s, blinds Chinese eyes in orbit during conflict.

AI’s role fascinates: U.S. systems use adaptive guidance, dodging defenses. China focuses AI on surveillance, stifling broader innovation due to state control fears. Geopolitically, MST-equipped subs (quiet, unlimited range via nukes) could dismantle China’s long-range fleet, confining the rest to coasts. Recent exercises, like sub-launched Tomahawks in simulated Iran strikes (June 2025), show readiness.

But Zeihan’s right: Ships move, demanding smart targeting. Historical parallels? The 1982 Falklands War, where Exocet missiles sank British ships, previewed anti-ship threats. Today, with hypersonics looming, Tomahawk upgrades keep pace. My concern? Cyber vulnerabilities—hack a guidance system, and it’s game over. Still, this bolsters deterrence, making Chinese adventurism costlier.

Political Pitfalls: How Leadership Delays Let Rivals Catch Up

Zeihan’s analysis gets spicy on politics. Why the lag? Clinton era: Post-Cold War optimism, no need for anti-Russia/China weapons. Bush Jr.: Distracted by 9/11 and wars, relying on Russia for Afghan logistics. Understandable, but missed opportunities.

Then Obama: Russians invading neighbors, Chinese hacking OPM databases (2015 breach exposed 22 million records). Yet, no pushback—Zeihan suggests Obama viewed the military skeptically, avoiding empowerment. Trump: Strategic incompetence, tweeting over substance. Result? 12 years of inertia while foes advanced.

Enter Biden: At 82 in 2025, his ’80s Senate experience recalls INF and Tomahawk dawn. Zeihan credits this context for decisive action—deploying MRC, upgrading Tomahawks. It’s not all praise; Biden’s age raises questions, but on security, he’s delivered robust policies.

Geopolitically, this highlights leadership’s role. Trump’s 2019 INF exit enabled responses, but implementation waited. In 2025, with elections looming, continuity matters. Reflections: In polarized times, consistent strategy is rare gold. If rivals bet on U.S. dysfunction, as Zeihan says, they’re “flat out fucking wrong.”

Broader Implications: AI, Satellites, and Pacific Flashpoints

Zeihan touches AI: China’s 1.4 billion population yields data, but paranoia curbs independent AI, favoring control tools. U.S. fosters open innovation—ChatGPT-like systems fuel military apps, from drone swarms to missile guidance. 2025 reports: DARPA’s AI pilots in dogfights, outflying humans.

Satellites: U.S. dominance in anti-sat tech (lasers, missiles, cyber) neutralizes China’s targeting. Historical note: Reagan’s SDI (“Star Wars”) laid foundations, evolving into today’s systems.

Flashpoints: Taiwan Strait exercises in 2025 saw U.S. MRC demos, deterring Beijing’s drills. South China Sea: Philippine basing for U.S. missiles challenges claims. Broader: Allies like Australia (AUKUS subs) and Japan (upgrading defenses) amplify U.S. reach.

Concerns: Escalation risks—missile deployments could provoke preemptive strikes. Environmentally, debris from sat wars endangers space. Economically, U.S. defense spending ($900B+ in 2025) sustains edge but strains budgets.

Wrapping Up: America’s Enduring Advantage and Uncertain Horizons

Zeihan’s hike-side chat reminds us: Don’t buy the hype—U.S. naval power endures through superior range, tech, and alliances. 2025 deployments like MRC in Australia and MST Tomahawks affirm it. Historically, from Midway to now, adaptability wins.

But challenges loom: Political volatility, cyber threats, China’s hypersonics. Zeihan’s jab at past leaders underscores: Strong decisions matter. In 2025, with Pacific tensions high, America’s moves signal resolve.

Personally, it’s heartening—U.S. innovation shines—but sobering: Wars start when edges blur. As Zeihan says, rivals underestimated us; now they deal with it. For global stability, let’s hope deterrence holds.

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About John Digweed

Life-long learner.