Xi Jinping’s conspicuous absence from the BRICS summit in Brazil this week wasn’t just a scheduling conflict, despite Beijing’s carefully crafted explanations. The real story, according to sources within China’s political circles, is far more explosive: the Chinese leader may have been effectively barred from leaving the country by his own opponents, who fear he might use any international trip as an opportunity to flee.
This sounds like the stuff of political thrillers, but the circumstantial evidence is mounting. Most telling is the abrupt dismissal of Ma Xingrui, the party secretary of Xinjiang and one of Xi’s most trusted loyalists, just five days before the summit. Ma’s sudden fall from grace—he was among only six provincial leaders elevated to the 24-member Politburo—marks the first major casualty from Xi’s inner circle in what appears to be an escalating power struggle.
The Xinjiang Connection
Ma’s position wasn’t just any provincial posting. As party secretary of Xinjiang, he controlled one of China’s most strategically sensitive regions, overseeing not just party affairs but military coordination, ethnic policies, and internal security. More crucially, Xinjiang shares an 1,100-mile border with Kazakhstan—a detail that becomes significant when you consider the alleged escape plan.
The backstory, as related by anti-CCP commentators with contacts in Beijing, reads like a spy novel. Late last year, Xi’s wife Peng Liyuan allegedly reached out to Ma through encrypted communications from Xi’s residence. The conversation, according to these sources, was stark: dark currents within the party were pushing for an investigation into former Premier Li Keqiang’s mysterious death, and Xi’s position was becoming increasingly precarious.
What followed was a series of clandestine meetings in Xinjiang, where Peng Liyuan used her role as a member of the Central Military Commission’s leadership evaluation committee as cover for reconnaissance trips. The plan, as described, involved two potential escape routes to Kazakhstan: overland through the Khorgos checkpoint or by air from Urumqi to Almaty.
The Shandong Network
Strikingly, the entire operation relied on personal loyalties rooted in regional ties. Ma, Peng Liyuan, and the military leaders controlling the border crossing all hail from Shandong Province—a web of connections that would have made the escape plan feasible. Ma had allegedly assured Peng that whenever they decided to make their move, he would personally escort them across the border, with orders already given to local commanders to let any high-ranking motorcade pass without question.
But this elaborate scheme ultimately unraveled when Peng’s repeated trips to Xinjiang caught the attention of her own security detail. In China’s surveillance state, even the first lady cannot escape the embedded monitoring systems. Her bodyguards, who double as informants for internal security, grew suspicious and reported their concerns to Cai Qi, the director of the CCP’s general office and head of the central security bureau.
The Loyalty Trap
Here’s where the story takes a particularly ruthless turn. Cai Qi, despite being one of Xi’s most loyal supporters, found himself facing an impossible choice. Remaining loyal to a fleeing leader would be political suicide, leaving him with no place in whatever new order emerged. So he made what may have been the most consequential betrayal in recent Chinese politics: he defected, reporting the escape plan to former premier Wu Bangguo and other party elders.
The interrogation of Xinjiang military commanders confirmed the worst fears of Xi’s opponents. Ma had indeed been facilitating Peng’s border reconnaissance and had given explicit instructions to let unidentified high-ranking officials pass through without questions. The party elders moved swiftly, removing Ma from his position and replacing him with someone they trusted.
Why Kazakhstan?
The choice of Kazakhstan as a destination wasn’t arbitrary. Xi has cultivated deep ties with the country since announcing his Belt and Road Initiative there in 2013. Chinese investment has poured billions into Kazakhstan’s infrastructure and energy sectors, creating substantial influence over the country’s political elite. The current president, Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, has personal connections to China—he studied in Beijing and speaks fluent Chinese, giving him a direct rapport with Xi that few world leaders share.
Perhaps more importantly, Xi’s extended family reportedly holds significant assets in Kazakhstan. His brother and brother-in-law are said to have business interests there, with Xi’s brother allegedly purchasing an estate near the capital, possibly in anticipation of future needs.
Russia, despite Xi’s public friendship with Putin, would have been a more problematic destination. Putin has no interest in being drawn into Chinese internal politics, and hosting Xi would create diplomatic complications that Moscow would prefer to avoid. Kazakhstan offers a more neutral option—close enough to China for practicality but politically insulated enough to provide genuine sanctuary.
The Broader Implications
What makes this story particularly compelling isn’t just the cloak-and-dagger elements, but what it reveals about the state of Chinese politics. The fact that such an elaborate escape plan was even considered suggests that Xi’s grip on power is far more tenuous than appearances suggest. The recent absence of Peng Liyuan from Xi’s international trips, once dismissed as coincidence, now takes on new significance.
Even more telling is the pattern of high-level dismissals and the subtle but unmistakable signs of shifting loyalties. When Hong Kong’s chief executive John Lee failed to acknowledge Xi in his recent anniversary speech—after prominently featuring him in previous years—it suggested that even Xi’s hand-picked appointees are hedging their bets.
The Death of Li Keqiang
Central to this entire saga is the specter of Li Keqiang’s death, which continues to haunt Xi’s inner circle. Li, who served as premier until 2023, was known for his willingness to speak uncomfortable truths about China’s economy, most notably his revelation that 600 million Chinese lived on less than $150 per month—a statement that directly contradicted Xi’s claims about eliminating poverty.
Li’s sudden death has become Xi’s biggest political liability, with growing calls within the party for a formal investigation. The mere possibility that Xi could be held accountable for his predecessor’s fate may have been enough to trigger the alleged escape planning.
The Current Standoff
With Ma’s dismissal and the escape plan apparently foiled, Xi finds himself in an increasingly precarious position. The missed BRICS summit isn’t just a diplomatic absence—it’s a sign that China’s leader may be effectively trapped within his own borders, unable to risk international travel that could provide an opportunity for exile.
The rumors swirling around former president Hu Jintao’s health add another layer of complexity. If Hu were to die, it would remove a key opposition figure, potentially giving Xi a temporary reprieve. But it would also likely intensify the broader power struggle, forcing both sides toward a final confrontation.
What’s clear is that Chinese politics has entered a period of unprecedented instability. The carefully choreographed image of unified party leadership is cracking, revealing the brutal calculations and personal betrayals that define power at the highest levels. Whether Xi can navigate this crisis or whether it will ultimately consume him remains to be seen.
For now, the man who once seemed destined to rule China for life appears to be fighting for his political survival—and possibly his freedom. The escape plan to Kazakhstan may have been thwarted, but the forces that made it seem necessary are still very much in play.
